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APALI company will shortly
publish a book, written by a veteran fighter pilot Jaakko Hyvönen,
telling about the history of night fighters in the first and second
World Wars. The emphasis is on the British and German operations. As
an addition there is also a short review of the Finnish night
fighter course in Germany in 1944. This is now presented at the
Fighter Tactics Academy web site.
FINNISH
NIGHT FIGHTER COURSE IN GERMANY IN 1944
HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
The
Finnish Air Force was founded as an independent service of arms on
the 6th of March, 1918. The first aircraft was donated by
a Swedish count, Erik von Rosen. On the wings of the airplane was
painted his personal lucky insignia, the blue swastikas. This was
the origin of the first official Finnish Air Force marking.
The
Winter War of 1939 / 1940 was the baptism of fire for the Finnish
Air Force. The Soviet
Union
and Nazi Germany had formed a pact in 1939 which resulted in the
German attack on Poland, in September of that year. Subsequent to
that assault, was the Soviet Union`s attack on Finland, on the 30th
of November, of the same year.
The
small nation of Finland had not taken good care of the materiel for
her Defense Forces. For example, the number of fighter aircraft was
alarmingly small. However, their training and their combat readiness
was high. The Finnish Air Force had, as the first in the world,
begun to train in the loose, broad section and finger four
formations as early as 1935. Furthermore, training in aerial gunnery
had been heavily emphasized.
The
Soviet order of battle enjoyed a tenfold superiority over the
Finnish Defense Forces. However, the Defense Force was able to stop
the Soviet offensive while inflicting heavy losses on their enemy.
The ineffectiveness of the Soviet offensive became an embarrassment
to the Soviet superpower and they considered suing for a temporary
peace agreement. On the other hand, Germany being hostile, official
Sweden strictly neutral and the support plans of France and Great
Britain proving to be inadequate, Finland had not resources enough
to continue the fight alone. The temporary peace treaty was thus
signed on the 13th of
March, 1940. Finland yielded certain areas in Karelia but
achieved the most important goal by saving her independence. The
main Finnish fighter during that time, the Fokker D XXI, achieved a
kill ratio of 16 :1.
Finland`s
strategic position remained difficult. Stalin told his commanders
before the Winter War, that the Finns must be moved out of Finland.
Foreign Minister Molotov, on a trip to Germany in November of 1940,
demanded that the “problem of Finland”, be resolved for good.
Finland`s supporters, France and Great Britain, were themselves
involved in the war, so it became quite hard for Finland to find
ways to improve its defense and commercial activities.
Finland
had begun the acquisition of fighters during the Winter War and
these began, now, to arrive in greater numbers. The Finnish Air
Force (FAF) was finally reinforced with fighter aircraft from the
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, some of its
own domestic designs and even some captured Soviet airplanes.
The
strategic situation in the northern theater changed gradually during
1940 and early 1941. The Soviet-German pact began to fade, as
Germany started preparations for its eastern offensive. Principally
as a consequence of the surprising result of the Winter War,
Germany`s hostile attitude towards Finland changed to one of sudden
interest in cooperation. In an ironic twist, Finland found that the
only nearby country with whom they could trade and enjoy an economic
relationship to improve the defense status, was the Soviet`s former
ally, Germany.
When
Germany opened their eastern offensive against the Soviet Union in
June of 1941, Finland had already given Germany permission to stage
their units through Lapland. After Soviet bombers had attacked
various targets in Finland on the 25th of June, 1941, the
Finns officially began military cooperation with Germany and so
began the Continuation War.
From
a political point of view, Finland didn`t want to be in an allied
relationship with Nazi Germany. However, from a military standpoint
cooperation was the only solution possible to repulse the Soviet
threat. But, Finland drew the line despite numerous requests by
Germany to advance their forces for an attack on Leningrad and
beyond a demarcation line drawn at Eastern Carelia.
In
the beginning of the Continuation War, Soviet forces in the theater
enjoyed only a two to one superiority over the Finns. This permitted
the Finnish forces to advance rather quickly to establish a
defensive line where a trench warfare network was ultimately located.
When the tide of war changed and the German forces began to retreat
westward, Soviet pressure on the Finnish defense increased. In the
spring of 1944, the Soviets made the decision to try to take Finland
before the race to Berlin.
They
amassed a tenfold superiority in troops and aircraft on the Karelian
Isthmus and began their strategic offensive on the 9th of
June, 1944. The Soviet advance achieved an initial success, forcing
the withdrawal of the Finnish forces along the isthmus. However, in
July of 1944, the Finns were able to stabilize the front on the
Vuoksi River and further attempts by the Soviet forces to advance
past this line, were turned back. The miracle of the Winter War had
been repeated.
The
peace agreement was made on the 4th of September, 1944,
and according to that Finland retired to the 1940 border.
Nevertheless, the results of both the Winter War and the
Continuation War were considered major victories for Finland. From
the opening shots of the Winter War to the end of the Continuation
War, the Finnish objective was to save Finland and to quarantee her
independence. This was done and also one interesting point was made:
of all the countries in the European theater participating the
Second World War, there were only two, which never were occupied:
Finland and Great Britain.
There
are three basic factors that made the Finnish fighter force
successful:
v
The
philosophy of loose and broad section and finger four formations
which the FAF adopted already in 1935.
v
The
emphasis on individual accuracy in air-to-air gunnery which was
trained for systematically. The Finnish fighter pilots didn`t just
shoot at the target airplane, they shot at certain parts of the
target airplane.
v
The
principle to always attack regardless of numbers which gives the
advantage of initiative.
A
supporting factor was the individual freedom of action inside the
formation. The principle of "first see, first shoot"
applied to every pilot from the squadron commander to the last
wingman. This increased the effectiveness of the entire formation
cutting delays and making every pilot an efficient shooter in a
revolutionary way.
The
main Finnish fighter in the beginning of the Continuation War,
Brewster 239, achieved a kill ratio of 32 : 1, and later
Messerschmitt 109 G achieved a kill ratio of 25 : 1.
NEED
OF NIGHT FIGHTERS DISCOVERED
The
city of Helsinki, being located on the coast, was a difficult place
to protect, especially during night air raids. Before the advent of
radar, the enemy, approaching from the sea, had a good possibility
of surprising the anti aircraft artillery. The “Triple A”
operated on the seacoast, and didn`t have depth for an effective
defense.
Surveillance
radars would have made it possible to detect approaching bombers in
time, and radar equipped night fighters would have been able to
attack them while they were still over the sea, and then continue
the attacks during the bombers` return flights.
However,
the Finnish Air Force didn`t have night fighters, and the first
surveillance radars and anti aircraft artillery tracking radars
weren`t available until April of 1943.
The
idea of night fighter operations had been under consideration for
some time, because an increase in Soviet night air raids, had been
expected.
On
the 7th of March, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, Lieutenant General Lundquist, gave the Commander of the 3rd
Fighter Wing an order to begin training night fighter pilots. The
plan was to use the Brewster day fighters for night fighter
operations. The Brewster was easy to fly and had long endurance, so,
it was better suited than the other fighters for the night fighter
mission.
The
training was started in autumn but it didn`t lead to the
establishment of a night fighter system.
The
Chief of the Air Force Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Pajari and the
Commander of 26. Fighter Squadron, Major Carlson, visited Germany in
the spring of 1943, to familiarize themselves with the German night
fighter system and its special arrangements.
On
4th of June, 1943, the Air Force Commander sent a letter
to Finland`s Supreme Commander, Marshal Mannerheim, requesting a
decision to be made on the establishment of a night fighter force,
and the approval of a list of fighters and radars to be ordered from
Germany.
Soviet
bombers flew night air raids on Helsinki, on the 7th, 17th and 27th
of February, 1944. There had been some initial negotiations about a
temporary peace between Finland and the Soviet Union, but the
Soviet`s terms had been totally unreasonable, and the Finns rejected
them. Soviet reaction to this rejection came by those air raids.
On
the 12th of February, five days after the first Soviet night air
raid, a strengthened night fighter flight 1./ JG 302 from Germany,
commanded by Hauptmann Lewens, landed at Malmi air base, with a
mission to protect Helsinki.
The
German pilots flew Messerschmitt 109 G-6 fighters, and used the
Wilde Sau tactics which demanded either bright moonlight or the
support of searchlights.
The
unit flew interception sorties against the next two Soviet air raids
and achieved some night victories. But, the main burden for the
defense remained with the anti aircraft artillery which used
effective barrage tactics, enforced by special phosphorus artillery
rounds. Fortunately, the majority of the Soviet`s bombs fell outside
of the city. Later, Finnish bomber squadrons secretly joined the
Soviet bomber formations flying over the Gulf of Finland and then
bombed the illuminated Soviet air bases while their bombers were
landing.
Anyway,
the Soviet air raids against Helsinki caused the final go ahead for
the establishment of night fighters.
DECISION
OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGHT FIGHTER SQUADRON
When
the paper work was done and the negotiations with the Germans
successful, the final decision for the establisment of a Finnish
night fighter squadron was made. The first pilots would be trained
in Germany.
It
was estimated that the squadron would be operational by the autumn
of the same year, before the year`s next dark season. The plan was
that the pilots trained there, would fly the newly purchased night
fighters home.
PILOT
SELECTION
The
pilot group was collected in a hurry. Every squadron commander was
told to use his judgment in selecting pilots who were willing and
capable, and send the information to the Air Staff. Also, those
pilots should be given a psycho-physiological examination.
There
was no special demands placed on the selectee, but, of course, at
least a satisfactory proficiency in the German language was
recommended since it was the training language that would be used.
Anyway, no proof of proficiency in German was demanded. So as luck
would have it, one of the chosen pilots couldn`t speak a word of
German, but he managed to do well, with help from his fellow pilots.
No
one was ordered to go to the training program; all were volunteers.
Every
candidate had good eye-sight which was regularly examined in the
psycho-physiological department of the Tilkka military hospital, in
Helsinki.
The
normal test at that time, covered the sharpness of vision, stereo
eye sight, straightness of eyes (no tendency to cross), and color
blindness. Now, every candidate was given an additional exam using a
new Nyktometer, specially bought from Germany. It was used to test
hemeralopia. The candidate´s eyes were blinded by a powerful light
and the time to recover was measured. If the time was too long, the
pilots way to Germany was cut. Some of the candidates were cancelled
by the Nyktometer.
About
50 pilots were tested, and then returned to their squadrons for a
week or two, to await the results.
The
Air Staff``s selection of pilots was evenly distributed among the
various squadrons.
SELECTED
PILOTS
The
following twenty pilots were selected:
Captains:
KALIMA,
Martti Johannes
RUUSKANEN,
Kaarlo Juhani
Lieutenants:
EHANTI,
Per Erik
HELLE,
Juha
HYVÄRINEN,
Esko
LAAKSO,
Lauri Rafael
LEMSTRÖM,
Jarl Enock
LOUHIJA,
Leo
NYSTEN,
Mauri
SAARVE,
Erkki
1st
Lieutenants:
HELPPI,
Onni Aulis
LILJA,
Risto Aksel
MATTSSON,
Kaarlo Erik
MATTSSON,
Lauri Eelis
SARANTOLA,
Olli Antero
TARKKANEN,
Olavi Richard
TERVO,
Matti Johannes
Senior
Sergeant:
HAKULINEN,
Yrjö Ilmari
Sergeants:
BÄCKMAN,
Mauno Fredrik
RINGBOM,
Bengt Raoul
The
selected pilots received their orders to report to the Air Staff in
Helsinki, on the 12th of June, at 0900 hours. Before that
everyone got a short leave.
TRIP
TO GERMANY
On
the 12th of June, Major Haaki addressed the group
and told them that the Commander of the Air Force had nominated
Captain Kalima as their leader. They would depart on two transport
airplanes, the next day.
The first group of ten, led by Captain
Kalima, took off for Germany on the 13th of June, at 0600
hours, by Finnish Air Force Douglas DC-2. The flight route was via
Tallinn and Riga to Königsberg. Bad weather caused them to fly at
low level (150 - 300 feet / 50 - 100 m) from Helsinki to Riga. Then
the weather began to improve and by the time they landed in Königsberg,
at 0950 hours, the weather was fine and sunny.
The checking of passports and travel
permissions, ”ausweises”, was done quickly, and in Königsberg,
the local komendant gave them their German papers and tickets for
the train to Berlin.Travel by train was obviously a safety measure,
because German air space was full of combat action and they wanted
to avoid unnecessary risks for the Finnish transport aircraft.
The second group, led by Captain Ruuskanen,
departed Malmi air base at 1400 hours which gave the first group
time to look around Königsberg before they met them at the airfield.
BY TRAIN TO BERLIN
At 2000 hours
that evening they started their trip to Berlin in a train that was
so full, there were no possibilities to sit down. Next morning, on
14 June at 0700 hours, the pilots arrived at the Anhalterbahnhof in
Berlin, wondering how to contact Major Ervi, a Messerschmitt pilot
assigned the duty of military attache. The telephone number they had
been given, didn`t work and there was no answer at his home phone.
The address for
the military attache`s office led them to a pile of ruins (Berlin at
that time was already very much destoyed by the war, just three
months earlier they had experienced
the last of sixteen massive air strikes that had utilized
9,000 heavy British bombers).
However, in front
of the neighboring house, there were a couple of cars with CD plates,
so, something like an embassy had to be nearby.
Just then, a
window opened and a female voice asked in plain Finnish: “What are
the pilot gentlemen looking for?”.
The next night
was spent in Berlin and all slept in peace without air raid alarms.
TO ALTENBURG
On the15th of
June at 0732 hours, the train left for Altenburg, 25 miles ( 40 km)
south of Leipzig. They arrived in Altenburg at 1030 and switched to
bus for the short 5 mile (8 km) trip to Leinawald air base east of
Altenburg. Jagdgeschwader 110 and the instrument flying school,
Blindflugschule, for single-engine pilots was located in Leinawald
Fliegerhorst.
The Commander of
Leinawald Fliegerhorst was Hauptmann Falderbaum. Before the war,
then Oberfeldwebel Falderbaum, won the European championship in
aerobatics flying a Bücker Jungmeister acrobatic biplane. (Falderbaum
lost his life after the war in a flight accident. The ultra light
experimental he was test flying broke apart at an altitude that was
too low for his parachute to open).
The Geschwader
operated from three air bases around Altenburg. Falderbaum`s I.
Gruppe used Leinawald, II. Gruppe was in Pomssen and III. Gruppe at
Gethein. The first two gruppes were equipped with Messerschmitt Me
109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters, and the third gruppe was a
training unit operating out of a temporary base, using light primary
and advanced trainers.
Pomssen and
Gethein air bases were 19 - 30 miles (30 - 50 km) from Leinawald.
The first day,
the Finnish pilots were familiarized with local personnel and places.
The course housed the ”Finnengruppe” in groups of two or three
students to an apartment that included a bedroom and a living room.
The food was good and just like in Finland, they received special
”pilot food” consisting of bisquits, butter, marmalade and
chocolate.
THEORETICAL PROGRAM
The ground school portion of the program,
containing about a hundred lessons with tests, started on the 16th
of June, and continued daily until the middle of July. In the
beginning of each phase, the instructors asked how much the students
already knew about the subject.
The most important subjects were:
- Navigation (36 hours): the theoretical
basis for navigation, navigation planning using the wind triangle
and calculus, calculations for instrument approach and landing, and
using radio navigation,
- N.V.W. (19 hours): the ground organization
and radio traffic for night fighters, the air control systems, the
air surveillance map system, the control system for night flights
and Dunkel Nachtjagd, and the special radio equipment use by the
allied forces,
- Funken (14 hours): receiving morse code,
at least 30 letters or numbers per minute. In addition, 3 hours of
receiving flashing light code, in groups of 2 - 3 letters or in
short words,
- Technik (7 hours): the most important
technical information about airplanes, equipment and instruments,
and
- Wetterkunde (6 hours): a short review of
meteorology, especially the weather conditions in Germany.
Other subjects were:
- Praktische Einweisung Technik: cockpit
familiarization,
- Waffenlehre: familiarization of fighter
weapons and armament,
- Schiesslehre: air gunnery by educational
films,
- Flugzeug Erkennungsdienst: identification
of airplane types,
- Gruppenlehre: air base and air traffic
information,
- Schwarmführer: division leader`s
information about the characteristics of various aircraft types.
TRAINERS
Along with ground
school theory, came the practical flying program. First there were
training flights in the Gotha Go 145 and then the Arado Ar 96 B
airplanes, followed by instrument flying.
In addition to
the flying, an intensive 60 sorties` program in German Blindflug-
und Übungsgerät (reminding one of the familiar Link Trainer), was
accomplished.
The Gotha Go 145
was an open cockpit bi-plane with a fixed undercarriage; very much
like the Finnish ”Tuisku” (Blizzard) used in the FAF Air
Academy.
The Arado Ar 96 B
had an air cooled Argus AS 410 engine, adjustable-pitch propeller,
landing flaps, and retractable landing gear. It was an all metal
monoplane where the student sat in front of the instructor, under a
single canopy. It had about the same performance as the Finnish
fighter trainer ”Pyry” (Whirlwind) but with more equipment.
AIR BASE ARRANGEMENT
Because the
training took place on an active night fighter base, every student
had to know, in detail, the regulations and arrangements which had
to be followed (in all German night fighter air bases).
The illumination
of the air-base was as follows:
- the obstacles
outside of the base were marked by red lights,
- the borders of
the base were marked by groups of red lamps, arranged with their tip
pointing to the base,
- the landing
direction was shown by accumulator lamps placed in a line at 50 m
intervals,
- the arrangement
of lamps in the landing direction was: three red lamps, followed by
white lamps for the entire length of the landing area, then at the
end 4 to 5 more red lamps. At a safe distance in from the border, a
line of red lamps was located at the end of, and perpendicular (crosswise)
to the main line of landing lights. On the left side of the first
white lamp of the line, and
about 20 m away, was another white lamp showing that the landings
should be made on the right side of the line. If that lamp was
located on the right side, the landings then had to be made on the
left side of the line. The earliest point of touch down was to be
made abeam the first white lamp and the latest, abeam the fourth
white lamp. All taxiing was done on the opposite side of the line
than the take offs and landings. The last 4 - 5 red lamps marked the
end of the runway, and it was not permitted to taxi over the line of
red lights that crossed the end.
- the take off
controller`s position was located left of the first white lamp, and
circled by red lights,
- located on the
border of the airbase, on the left side of the light line, was a
searchlight,
- the place for
refueling, all obstacles, parked aircraft and aprons were marked by
three red lamps,
- outside of the
airbase, on the approach line, was a searclight transmitting the
light code (changed from time to time) of the airbase,
- most of the
airbases had a horizontal line of 10 to 15 lamps, located 1 to 10 km
outside of the base, on both ends of the main runway (depending on
terrain), pointing to the base. The objective was to create an
artificial horizon to make the landings and take offs easier.
The border lights
of the airbase were on from the take off of the first plane to the
landing of the last one. They were switched off, only if an enemy
airplane came directly toward the base.
The other lights
were switched on only after one of their own airplanes dropped a
confirmed flare or made a proper request by radio.
When enemy
bombers approached, all of the airbase`s airplanes were ordered to
land by radio contact or signalling with green flares. At the same
time, all of the searchlights in the area pointed their cones
vertically for 30 seconds, and then started to rotate them around in
a 45 degree angle. Everybody had to obey the signals immediately so
that their aircraft would not disturb the tracking of the enemy
bombers and their own night fighters.
The ground
organization for the airbase consisted of following personnel and
units:
- a permanent and
specially trained air traffic control officer who was responsible
for the entire airbase organization,
- a
meteorological officer and weather personnel,
- base air
controllers,
- communication
personnel,
- maintenance
personnel,
- fuel, armament
and supply personnel,
- a radio station,
- a direction
finder station,
- a
meteorological station,
- a fire brigade.
INSTRUMENT AND NIGHT FLYING TRAINING
All of the
Finnish students had received instrument training, and training in
flying at night and in clouds, which had been conducted at home, but
especially the younger pilots in the fighter squadrons had not flown
many instrument sorties after their basic and advanced flying
courses, so this type of training was quite welcome.
The Germans
considered the complete skill of instrument flying, as the most
important virtue of a night fighter pilot. The instructors stated
that the night fighter pilot had to learn instrument flying so well,
that he was able to “fly by instruments without instruments” and
concentrate all of his attention on the search for the enemy.
The German
program was effective and its objective was to make the student rely
completely on his instruments and use only them, in all situations,
to control his plane.
Especially in bad
weather and in the heat of combat, even the most experienced pilot
could begin to doubt his instruments, and become confused.
The instructors,
all having night air combat experience, had a positive and objective
attitude and were quick to recognize the rapid advances made by the
talented Finnish pilots.
New things, like
the latest radio navigation methods and familiarization with the
night terrain, were learned during many night navigation flights.
The flight
program in Altenburg consisted of about 38 flight hours per student,
divided between the Arado Ar 96 (27 to 28 hours) and the Gotha G 145
(6 to 7 hours). In addition, every student flew instrument approach
sorties (3 to 4 hours) in a twin engined Siebel Si 204 plane.
VISITS BY ALLIED FORCES
In that phase of
the war, allied air operations extended to every part of Germany.
This included Leinawald air base, and even though it was located
over 310 miles (500 km) from the coast, it got its share of the
visits.
In the morning of
29th of June, class was interrupted because of an air
raid alarm. It was a so called carpet bomb alarm, ”bombenteppichalarm”,
which was given when a big enemy formation was approaching the base.
Everyone had to leave the base by foot (to a distance of 2 - 3 km
away), or by car (5 - 7 km away). However, the bomber formation,
which was being attacked by fighters and fired upon by anti aircraft
artillery, flew over the base without dropping its bombs.
On the 11th
of July, the night training flights were interrupted for a couple of
hours. The reason was that part of a formation of 50 Mosquitos
coming from Leipzig, returned via Altenburg.
On the 13th
, the allied bomber formations again flew over Altenburg.
Two Mustang
escort fighters attacked a landing Do 217 and shot it down, they
also fired at a parked He 111 which started to burn. After damaging
a parked Me 410, the Mustangs were in-turn, attacked by four Me 109
fighters which were on a low level interception sortie.
The spectators on
the ground saw an interesting air combat raging over the base at 150
to 1,500 feet (50 to 500 m). During the air battle, both of the
Mustangs were shot down, but the Germans lost one of their fighters
too.
On 18 July, a
British offensive counterair night fighter suddenly attacked the
base. The lights of the base were still on, regardless of the alarm,
because two Gothas of the German night fighter pilot course were
still airborne with their navigation lights on.
The, obviously
very professional, British night fighter pilot saw them, and shot
both down; one started to burn and crashed in a forested area, while
the wounded pilot of the other aircraft was able to make an
emergency landing at the airbase.
TRANSFER TO LUDWIGSLUST
After instrument
flying training in Altenburg, their course moved more north to
Ludwigslust air base, about 60 miles (100 km) south-east of Hamburg,
where they were to get night fighter training in an actual combat
plane.
They left
Altenburg on the 21st of July, by train, and after
traveling via Leipzig, Wittenberg and Stendal, the main group was in
Ludwigslust at 1000 hours next morning. Captains Kalima and
Ruuskanen made a detour through Berlin to give a status report to
Major Ervi, and arrived the next day.
At the
Fliegerhorst of Ludwigslust there was a training squadron, ergänzungsgruppe,
and an operational night fighter unit.
The latter`s Me
110, Me 109 and Fw 190 fighters could be seen during daylight hours,
on the opposite side of the base. Often, during the night, the
fighters took off for interception sorties, and sometimes, fighters
from other units would land at the base.
So, the students
had an opportunity to discuss air combat with German night fighter
pilots, and others too, even Generalleutnant Adolf Galland.
The Commander of
the Fliegerhorst was Major, soon to be Oberstleutnant Lorenz, who
when meeting a Finnish pilot, always remembered to ask if everything
was all right and were there any wishes.
The
accommodations were arranged in guest rooms and all daily details
were handled by Germans. This was very helpful because their daily
schedule was tight and long.
TRAINING IN LUDWIGSLUST
The training in
Ludwigslust was more flying oriented than it was at Altenburg, and
it started immediately.
For
familiarization of the area, everybody flew a local flight in an
Arado, which covered an area between Schwerin about 19 miles (30 km)
north of Ludwigslust, and to the Elbe river about the same distance
south. So, each pilot had an opportunity to store in his memory, the
most important terrain characteristics to be used while flying the
faster aircraft.
When all the
students had made a couple of landings in a four seater
Messerschmitt Me 108 Taifun, and an hours instrument check flight in
an Arado, they were ready to start type training in the Me 109.
For this, a two
seater version, the Me 109 G-12 was available. The student, who sat
in front, had a normal Me 109 cockpit, but the instructor behind him,
sat in a narrow cockpit equipped with only the most important
instruments. The original canopy was extended back over the
instructors head. This arrangement gave the student very much a
feeling of solo flight.
By using the two
seater, the Germans tried to decrease the disproportionate number of
accidents caused by the exceptionally strong torque generated by the
Me 109`s propeller at take off power. Obviously, everywhere the Me
109 was used a couple of two seaters, if available, paid for
themselves in a big way.
About an hour`s
flight with ten landings was enough time in the two seater, and then
the student was ready to move to the single seat, Me 109 G-6. At
first, there were three flight hours in daylight which included
about thirty landings, a high altitude flight at 33,300 feet (10,000
m) and two gunnery sorties at ground targets.
After that, they
started the night flying training, which consisted of about ten
flight hours with emphasis on the landings. In addition, during
daylight, instrument flights were flown in the clouds. Although it
was night fighter training, all in all only 30 % of the Ludwigslust
program was flown at night.
The night flight
portion included navigation sorties, instrument sorties flown in
cloudy conditions, a high altitude flight at 28,300 feet (8,500 m),
and an interception sortie. The target for the interception training
was an illuminated Do 217 bomber flown over Berlin. After the
interception, they made an intermediate landing at Werneuchen then
returned to Ludwigslust.
In the Me 109 G-6
program, the students got about 27 hours of flight time with 80
landings. The night sorties generated 10 flight hours and 35
landings.
Each student`s
total flight training in Germany included, on average, 68 flight
hours and 200 landings, with 44 of the flight hours and 70 landings
being performed at night.
TRAINING LOSSES
Pilot losses in
the German night fighter courses were high; anywhere between 20 and
75 % of the students died during the course. One of the major
reasons was the need to train more and more inexperienced pilots.
Germany was only
prepared for a short war, and now in its prolonged state, the
training of a pilot reserve became a real bottleneck for the
Luftwaffe. For example, in the beginning of 1944, the Germans had to
send new pilots, with only 160 hours of flight time, to the
frontline squadrons. While at the same time, their British and
American colleagues already had at least double that amount.
In the first half
of 1944, the German`s home air defense, lost 2,000 of its pilots as
killed, lost or wounded. Replacing such a big number was possible
only by reducing the number of hours in the training programs, which
also became mandatory due to the shortage of fuel. So, by the summer
of 1944, the new German pilots received no more than 112 hours of
flight training. By February of 1945, Luftwaffe`s entire flying
training program came to a complete halt, because of the lack of
fuel.
The Finns managed
to complete their night fighter course with only 10 % losses. They
suffered two fatalities which were caused by external factors.
Sergeant Ringbom
took off on the 17th of August, for a routine night
training flight. Soon after take off, there was an air raid alarm
and the order to land was given. However, Ringbom never acknowledged
the order.
His airplane was
found later, not far from the base and it had been hit by several 20
mm cannon rounds. Obviously, he was shot down by a British night
fighter which had been seen flying over the base, soon after the
alarm.
The other
accident happened only three days later at 0300 hours in the early
morning. Sub-Lieutenant Tervo had started his approach to the
airfield, when the engine of his airplane stopped due to a failure
in the fuel system. In an attempt at an emergency landing, his plane
crashed short of the field and Tervo was killed.
END OF TRAINING
The accidents happened during the last
remaining flights, for already on the 24th of August the
night flying program had been completed.
There was no precise information about the
situation in Finland. The students knew that the Soviets had began
their strategic offensive, just before they left, but after that the
news had been sparse. The most reliable information came by way of
Major Ervi.
The students considered their next move
would be to go to Wiener-Neustadt to fetch the new fighters and fly
them back to Finland. The discussions about the fighter type for the
new squadron revolved around the Me 109 G-6 or, as hoped for by the
most optimistic pilots, the latest modification K, ”Kurfürst”.
There were also rumors circulating, about Me 110 twin-engine
training in Germany, for some of the students.
TO JÜTERBOG AND BERLIN
On the 26th, there was a big
farewell party for the Finnish pilots at the Fliegerhorst, which was
celebrated in style.
On the next day, the group traveled by train
via Berlin to Jüterbog-Waldlager air base. This large night fighter
base was located about 37 miles (60 km) south-west from the city`s
center. There in the operational environment, during the last four
days of August, the students were familiarized with night fighter
operations and its special details.
Then all the others, except for Captain
Kalima and Lieutenants Ehanti, Helle, Laakso and Lemström, traveled
to Berlin to wait for their return to Finland. The plan was, that on
the 6th of September, the remaining pilots would receive five new Me
109 fighters, and fly them to Finland.
While there, the Finnish pilots belonged to
1./ JG 300, which had as its mission, the hunting of the Mosquitos
and the protection of Berlin. The fighters of the staffel were fast
Me 109 G-6 aircraft, ”Moskito-jägers”, with 1,800 to 2,000 hp
methanol/water injection Daimler-Benz DB 605 ASD engines.
FINNS INTERNED
The main group,
which had returned to Berlin, was accommodated in the Excelsior and
Norrland hotels. Lieutenant Hyvärinen with two sub-lieutenants, was
slated for travel to Poland on the 4th of September,
where they were to receive three Me 109 night fighter modifications,
from the local factory. The plan, was to fly from there to Hyvinkää
air base, in Finland. This airbase had been readied for the future
night fighter operations. The tickets for the train trip were
already in their pockets.
In a Berlin
evening newspaper of 3 September, there had been something about the
negotiations between Finland and Soviet Union (Finland had repulsed
the Soviet main offensive in the Karelian isthmus in the middle of
July, and by the beginning of August the situation had stabilized
along the entire Finnish eastern front. The Soviet Union needed its
troops in the central European theater and started to remove them
from the Finnish front. On the 4th of September an agreement was
made for a temporary peace between Finland and the Soviet Union).
That evening, the
group had a meeting about the possible consequences of that action,
and it seemed probable that they would be interned. Major Ervi
couldn`t be contacted, and all the Finnish Embassy knew, was that
the negotiations were on going.
At 2330 hours a
Wehrmacht major along with a hefty feldwebel, arrived at the hotel
where they were told in strict but polite way, that it would be
better for the gentlemen to move to a Wehrmacht hotel. In the Hermes
hotel at Friedrichsstrasse, the pilots were required to give up all
their papers, and quards were posted at the front doors. Inside the
hotel, they were allowed to move about freely and their treatment
was impeccable.
Their internment
time wasn`t long, by noontime of 6 September, it was cancelled. The
next day, they rode the
train to Stettin and then to Odermünde harbor, where the Åland`s
ship S/S Parma was waiting. It had just brought a timber load to
Germany.
Senior Sergeant
Hakulinen was no longer with the group because he had suffered a bad
ache in his back, the end of August, and had already been flown to
Finland.
The five men in
the Jüterbog group had a similar experience. They were also
interned on the German airbase. As a consolation, each had been
given a bottle of wine, special food and cigarettes.
On the 7th
of September, the papers for their release were sent by Major Ervi
and the group left the Germans at the airbase, with good mutual
understanding, and an abundant box lunch for their travel too. On
the next day, they joined the main group at the ship.
BACK HOME
On the 10th of September at 1700
hours, the ship left the harbor and by 2000, it was already at sea
and sailing for home. After being one day at anchor in Kalmar harbor,
Sweden, the ship arrived at Maarianhamina, on the 14th of
September at 1700 hours. Not until the next day, while onboard a
passenger vessel traveling to Turku, did the group get the
confirmation of the repulse of the Soviet offensive. This break in
the information vacuum was a giant relief.
There was only the train trip to Helsinki
and their multiphase, experience rich trip of 95 days would be
behind them.
On the 16th of September, 1944,
at 0900 hours, the group reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ilanko and
Major Karu at Air Staff Headquarters. From there, they were
transferred to Hyvinkää, their prepared night fighter airbase.
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